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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Benjamin Weintraub* and Alan N. Resnick**

WINDSOR ON THE RIVER: THE
EIGHTH CIRCUIT MAKES IT
HARDER TO FIND AN ACCEPTING
IMPAIRED CLASS NEEDED FOR
CRAM DOWN

Although most confirmed chapter
11 plans have been accepted by all
classes of creditors and equity interest holders, the Bankruptcy Code
provides that if a· plan is fair and
equitable and does not unfairly discriminate with respect to nonaccepting classes, and certain other
requirements are met, it may be
crammed down classes that do
not accept the plan. 1 One such requirement, set forth in Section
1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code
(the Code), is that if any class is
impaired under the plan, at least one
impaired class must accept the plan
without counting the votes of insiders _2 The purposca of this require* Special Counsel to the law firm of
Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler,
New York, N.Y.; Member of the National
Bankruptcy Conference.
**Benjamin Weintraub Distinguished
Professor of Bankruptcy Law, Hofstra University School of Law, Hempstead, N.Y.;
Counsel to the firm of Fried, Frank, Harris,
Shriver & Jacobson, New York, N.Y.;
Member of the National Bankruptcy Conference.
1
11 U.S.C. § 1129{b). See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1126 on voting requirements necessary for
a class to have accepted the plan.
2
See II U.S.C. § 1124 on impairment
of claims, and II U.S.C. § 101 for the
definition of "insider."

ment is to prohibit the debtor from
cramming down a plan against all
impaired classes. In essence, the
debtor must be able to persuade at
least one class of creditors-dealing
at arm's length-to accept a plan
that alters their legal or equitable
rights.
A recent case that has far-reaching effects on the ability of a debtor
to cram down a chapter 11 plan is
Windsor on the River Associates,
Ltd. v. Balcor Real Estate Finance,
Inc. 3 Windsor on the River Associates, Ltd. is a limited partnership
that owns only one asset, a 298unit apartment complex situated on
twenty-three acres in Cedar Rapids,
Iowa. The apartment complex was
purchased in 1982. In 1987, Windsor refinanced its existing mortgage
loan by borrowing $9.35 million
from Balcor Real Estate Finance,
Inc. Balcor was given a first mortgage on the apartment complex, as
well as an assignment of rents, to
secure Windsor's obligations under
a four-year note that provided for a
balloon payment of all unpaid principal and deferred interest in May
1991.
Windsor made all required payments on the note until March 1991,
when it tried unsuccessfully to nego-
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7 F.3d 127 (8th Cir. 1993).
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tiate a loan extension and to obtain
refmancing from other sources.
Only five days after the maturity
date of the loan, while in defaul~,
Windsor ftled a chapter 11 petition.
The bankruptcy court determined
that the value of the apartment complex was $10.5 million, while the
outstanding amount owed to Balcor
was approximately $9.9 million.
Therefore, Balcor was an oversecured creditor and did not have any
unsecured deficiency claim.
The Plan
Windsor's third amended plan,
which provided for a new $1 million
capital contribution by the partners,
divided the creditors' claims and the
partners' interests into six classes
with the following treatment:
Class 1, consisting of Balcor's
$9.9 million secured claim, was to
be reduced by a payment of
$500,000 on the effective date of
the plan (funded in part by $435,000
of the partners' capital contribution). The balance was to be paid in
monthly payments over ten years,
in amounts based on a thirty-year
amortization schedule with interest
at 8.5 percent, with a balloon payment due in ten years consisting of
the outstanding principal and accrued unpaid interest.
Class 2, consisting of a disputed
unsecured claim held by an individual in the amount of $59,249, was
to be paid in full sixty days after the
effective date. However, the district
court disallowed this claim, so that
Class 2 had no members.
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Class 3 consisted of unsecured
trade claims originally owed to thirty-four creditors, aggregating to
only $13,000. The plan provided
that· these claims were to be paid in
full sixty days after the effective
date.
Class 4 consisted of the claims of
tenants for return of their security
deposits. The plan provided for payment of these deposits in accordance
with the leases.
Class 5 consisted of the interests
of the limited partners.
Class 6 consisted of the interests
of the general partners.
Only Classes 1, 2, and 3 were
impaired under the plan; Class 1
(Balcor) voted to reject the plan,
and the only claim in Class 2 was
disallowed. Class 3, the unsecured
trade claims, accepted the plan and,
therefore, was the only impaired
class that accepted the plan.
Balcor feared that the plan could
be crammed down under Section
1129(b) of the Code despite its rejection of the plan. As previously
indicated, a plan may be confirmed
without the acceptance by all classes
if, among other requirements, at
least one impaired class-not counting the votes of insiders-accepts
the plan. To avoid this situatiof?.,
Balcor successfully challenged the
validity of the Class 2 claim and, to
secure an unfavorable vote by the
Class 3 trade creditors, purchased a
majority of the Class 3 claims.
The district court denied Balcor
the right to vote the Class 3 unsecured trade claims, in part because
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thirteen of the votes had been cast
before Balcor had purchased them.
Class 3 was deemed to have accepted the plan, providing the impaired
class required for cramdown. Baleor appealed to the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit, arguing that
Section 1129(a)(10) was not satisfied because Class 3 was not really
impaired.
Application of the Bankruptcy
Code
The court of appeals began its
analysis by setting forth its approach
to statutory construction.
Bankruptcy is a creature of statute.
Applications of the bankruptcy code
must, therefore, be consistent with
long established canons of statutory
construction. One such established
maxim is that ''the starting point for
interpreting a statute is the language
ofthestatuteitself." [Citations omitted.] While the language is the starting point, it is equally true that it
is the task of federal courts when
engaging in statutory construction
''to interpret the words of the statute
in light of the purposes Congress
sought to serve." [Citations omitted.] Accordingly, "we must avoid
statutory interpretation that renders
any section superfluous and does not
give effect to all of the words used
by Congress." [Citations omitted.t

The court then focused on the
language of Section 1129(a) of the
Code:
(a) The court shall confirm a plan
only if all of the following requirements are met:
4

/d. at 130.

(10) If a class of claims is impaired
under the plan, at least one class of
claims that is impaired under the plan
has accepted the plan, determined
without including any acceptance of
the plan by any insider. 5

The term "impaired" is explained in Section 1124 of the Code.
In general, pursuant to Section
1124(1), a claim is impaired under
a plan if the plan alters the legal,
equitable, or contractual rights to
which such claim or interest entitles
the holder. The court noted that,
"[b]y this standard, any alteration
of a creditor's rights, no matter how
minor, constitutes 'impairment.' '' 6
The court of appeals saw the central
issue in the case as being ''whether
such impairment may be manufactured at the will of the debtor,' ' in
the words of Judge Posner, ''just to
stave off the evil day of liquidation. " 7 The court answered this
question with a clear and definite
"no."
The court stated that it would be
contrary to the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code to allow manipulation
of claims in a chapter 11 case. The
court then commented that Section
1129(a)(10) was created to protect
lenders from the potential inequities
of the cram-down provisions of the
Bankruptcy Act. Recalling that, under the former act, a reorganization
plan for real property could have
been confirmed so long as the mort5

/d. at 130.
/d. at 130.
7
/d. at 130. The court was quoting from
Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of
Law 378 (3d ed. 1986).
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gagee received the appraised value
of the property, the court found that
Section 1129(a)(10) was included in
the Code "[t]o curb the inequities
of such reorganization plans being
'crammed down' the throat of secured lenders. The purpose of the
section 'is to provide some indicia
of support by affected creditors and
prevent confirmation where such
support is lacking.' " [Citations
omitted.] 8
The court continued:
Since Chapter 11 is designed to
promote consensual reorganization
plans, a proposal that has no support
from impaired creditors cannot serve
its purpose. It would be odd if an
amendment designed to give secured
creditors more protection were used
as the means to rewrite their credit
agreements without their consent.
Confirmation of a plan where the
debtor engineers the impairment of
the only approving impaired class
''so distorts the meaning and purpose
of [Section 1129(a)(10)] that to permit it would reduce (a)(10) to a nullity." [Citation omitted.]9

The Related Problem of Artificial
Classification
The court of appeals found that
the issue in this case was similar to
the so-called artificial classification
cases in which the debtor formulates
a chapter 11 plan that puts an undersecured mortgagee's large unsecured deficiency claim in a class
that is separate from the relatively
small unsecured claims of trade
8
9
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creditors. By separately classifying
the trade claims, and obtaining their
acceptance of the plan, Section
1129(a)(10) would be satisfied despite rejection of the plan by the
mortgagee who holds the only secured and the largest unsecured
claims. The court cited its own decision in In re Lumber Exchange
Building Ltd. Partnership, 10 where
it held that separate classification of
trade claims in that situation was
improper and affirmed dismissal of
the chapter 11 case.
The difference between the facts
in Lumber Exchange and those in
Windsor is that in Windsor the mortgagee is oversecured and, therefore, has no unsecured claim that
could be placed in the same class
as the unsecured trade creditors.
However, although classification in
Windsor is proper, the court focused
on the issue of whether impairment
of the small class of trade claims,
where the debor easily could have
left the class unimpaired, is a manipulation of the Code. The court commented that in a single-asset real
estate case involving an oversecured
mortgagee, the debtor's equity in
the property often is sufficient to
satisfy in full the much smaller unsecured trade claims, so that impairment of such claims is not necessary.

/d. at 131.
Id. at 131.

The possible effects of confirmation
under such circumstances are somewhat unsettling. Confirmation might
encourage similarly situated debtors
10
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to view the bankruptcy code as an
alternative to refinancing. First,
debtors with projects lacking the fiscal promise necessary to gain refinancing on the open market might
resort to section 1f29(a)(10) as the
mechanism by which they might draft
their own loans from existing lenders. Second, the very threat of such
an alternative might coerce lenders
into extensions of credit terms that
might otherwise not be called for by
market conditions. 11

Discouraging "Side Dealing"
The court also warn¢ that confrrmation of reorganization plans under such circumstances would directly undermine one of the primary
functions of bankruptcy law, which
is to discourage side dealing between the shareholders of a corporation and some creditors to the detriment of other creditors. Debtors in
these situations would be encouraged to make side deals with relatively small trade creditors-leaving them only marginally affectedin order to gain their acceptance of
a plan. "It is exactly such 'side
dealing' that prompted the adoption
of a bankruptcy code.'' 12
The court of appeals, based on
this reasoning, articulated its broad
holding as follows: "[W]e hold
that, for purposes of 11 U .S.C.
§ 1129(a)(10), a claim is not impaired if the alteration of rights in
question arises solely from the debtor's exercise of discretion. " 13
11

Windsor, 7 F.3d at 132.

The only accepting class alleged
to have been impaired under the
plan was Class 3, consisting of only
$13,000 in trade claims. The alleged impairment was the delay in
the full payment of these claims for
a period of sixty days. Clearly, such
a delay alters the legal rights of such
creditors and, therefore, they are
impaired under Section 1124(1) of
the Code. However, the question
of fact, according to the court of
appeals, was whether this class was
impaired for the purpose of satisfying Section 1129(a)(10): "If this
impairment has been manufactured,
then the plan must be regarded as
having circumvented the purpose of
the statute, namely, consensual reorganization. " 14
Although findings of fact made
by the trial court should not be disturbed on appeal unless they are
clearly erroneous, the court of appeals had no difficulty in finding
that the district court clearly erred
when it determined that the Class
3 trade claims were impaired for
Section 1129(a)(10) purposes. The
court of appeals found that the Class
3 trade claims, as well as the Class
2 claim that was eventually disallowed, were arbitrarily and artificially impaired, as may be shown by
simple remanipulation of the plan:
"Had Debtor's plan allowed for a
smaller payment to Balcor, say,
$400,000 instead of $500,000,
Debtor could have paid both the
Class 2 and Class 3 claimants on the
effective date. Balcor would have

12Jd.
13 /d.

14Jd.
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been the only impaired claimant. . . . Oddly, Balcor was placed
in the position of possibly having
to argue that it should receive less
under the plan in the hope that its
interests might be protected.' ' 15
Since Windsor could have easily
submitted a plan that would have
left the trade claims unimpaired,
Balcor became the only impaired
creditor. Given Balcor's preference
for immediate foreclosure of its
mortgage, it was unlikely that it
would accept any plan that the debtor might propose. Accordingly, the
court of appeals found that remand
of the case would be futile and it
dismissed the chapter 11 case.
Conclusion
The court of appeals in Windsor
could have reached the same result
by dismissing the case based on a
finding that the alleged impairment
of the small class of trade claims
was too de minimis to constitute true
itnpairment for Section 1129(a)(10)
purposes. It would be hard to disagree with a holding that slight impairment, such as delaying the full
payment of $13,000 in trade claims
for only sixty days in a case involving almost $10 million in total
claims, should not satisfy Section
1129(a)(10). To take this point to
the extreme, one could hardly imagine a court confirming a plan where
the only impaired class accepting
the plan is a very small class to be
paid in full only twenty-four hours
after the effective date, or who will
15
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receive 99.9 percent payment on the
effective date. If the court's holding
in Windsor was limited to de mini:
mis impairment situations, it would
not have been significant enough to
warrant an article in this journal.
It is especially interesting that the
court's opinion starts by stating the
issue as one involving only de minimis alteration of rights: ''At issue
is whether a debtor's voluntary
Chapter 11 reorganization plan can
be confirmed over the objections of
a secured creditor holding a claim
worth over 99 percent of the total
value of the claims against the debtor's assets, when no other creditors
are materially affected by the
plan. "t6
However, the holding is much
broader than that. The court of appeals did not limit its characterization of "artificial impairment" to
situations in which the alteration of
rights is de minimis. By holding that
impairment is artificial and, therefore, does not count for satisfying
Section 1129(a)(10) "if the alteration of rights in question arises
solely from the debtor's exercise of
discretion, " 11 the court is effectively prohibiting confirmation of any
plan where the debtor has in its
financial power the ability to leave
unimpaired all of those classes that
have accepted the plan.
For example, suppose that Windsor's plan provided that the unsecured trade creditors were to receive payments over the next two

/d. at 133.
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1
'
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years equaling only 10 percent of
their allowed claims, and that every
trade creditor, in good faith, accepted the plan because of the fear that
foreclosure would result in the loss
of a valued customer for its goods
and services. Clearly, the alteration
of their rights would be substantial,
resulting in the discharge of 90 percent of their prepetition claims.
Nonetheless, under its holding, the
court of appeals would deny confirmation because the trade creditors

would not be impaired under Section 1129(a)(10) since the debtor
had the discretion to pay them in
full and immediately.
While the Windsor decision may
slam the door on the debtor's ability
to confirm a chapter 11 plan in a
single-asset real estate case in the
Eighth Circuit without the mortgagee's acceptance, it also may make it
more difficult for debtors in other
types of businesses to successfully
cram down a chapter 11 plan under
Section 1129(b).
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